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Abstract
This article analyses the role that US states play in enforcing federal natural gas pipeline regulations.
The paper ﬁnds that states are more likely to have responsibility for enforcing these regulations if they
have larger networks of gathering and transmission lines and if their citizens are more liberal and
more pro-environment. Conversely, states with a larger natural gas industry are less likely to
assume oversight. However, whether a state has assumed oversight has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
either state enforcement eﬀorts or pipeline performance. The most eﬀective state enforcement tool
is monetary penalties, which signiﬁcantly decrease incidents and property damage.
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1.0 Introduction
According to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of
the US Department of Transportation (DOT), from 2003 to 2013 there were almost
2,400 natural gas pipeline incidents which resulted in a total of 129 fatalities, 529 injuries
and $2 billion dollars in property damage. The largest of these, such as the 2014 natural
gas pipeline explosion that levelled two buildings in New York City, capture the public’s
attention and can even result in Congressional calls to increase pipeline safety regulation.
However, pipelines are often the only economically viable means of transporting natural
gas and other forms of transport are likely to pose similar, if not greater, potential for
harm. Since natural gas plays a major role in US energy policy, making the transport of
natural gas through pipelines as safe as possible is an extremely salient issue that is unlikely
to go away in the near future. In fact, even though the USA currently has a natural gas pipeline network of over 300,000 miles of transmission lines and 2.1 million miles of distribution
lines, the recent increase in energy production from new sources such as the Bakken shale in
North Dakota and the Marcellus shale in the mid-Atlantic is driving pipeline operators to
expand the existing gas pipeline network. According to the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America, over $250 billion dollars of additional pipeline infrastructure
will be built over the next 25 years to accommodate projected energy production. With
an expanded natural gas pipeline network, safety and environmental performance concerns
will become an even more important regulatory and policy concern.
While the approval of new pipelines in the USA is the responsibility of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), once built the performance and safety of pipelines is the responsibility of the US DOT. In 2005, PHMSA was established as a division
of DOT to oversee pipelines, both those that transport natural gas as well as those that
transport petroleum products and other hazardous liquids. Within PHMSA, the Oﬃce
of Pipeline Safety (OPS) implements the regulatory programme for pipelines. OPS is a relatively small agency. There are currently just under 140 inspectors working for OPS out of
ﬁve regional oﬃces. The majority of pipeline safety inspections are conducted by 300 to 350
state inspectors. States typically inspect and enforce all intrastate pipelines, while both state
and federal regulators inspect interstate pipelines. Overall, states are responsible for
inspecting approximately 90 per cent of total natural gas pipelines. However, to date
there has been very little analysis, at least in the USA, of the enforcement of natural gas
pipeline safety regulations. The one exception is a paper by Staﬀord (2014). That paper
focuses on the eﬀect of federal enforcement on both natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline performance. The paper examines the performance of the largest pipeline operators in
the USA and ﬁnds that neither federal inspections or penalties are eﬀective in increasing
performance, although the number of federal cases initiated against an operator does
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on many forms of performance. The paper also includes some
controls for state enforcement eﬀorts and ﬁnds evidence suggesting that pipelines that
operate in states with higher levels of inspections and penalties perform better than pipelines that operate in states with lax controls. This paper seeks to expand upon those ﬁndings
to better determine how state enforcement eﬀorts aﬀect natural gas pipeline safety and
performance. To our knowledge, no other papers have examined this issue empirically.
One of the key dimensions of pipeline safety regulation in the USA is that both the state
and the federal government implement and enforce the regulations. The Natural Gas
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Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 gives states the right to participate in regulating and enforcing
pipeline safety as long as the state meets certain requirements for participation. States must
seek authorisation, also known as primacy, to regulate and enforce part or all of the pipeline regulations within their borders. Not all states seek primacy, and some states only seek
partial primacy. This paper examines the factors that aﬀect whether a state has primacy for
natural gas pipelines from the federal government. It then looks for diﬀerences in the level
of enforcement eﬀorts and pipeline performance in states that take this additional responsibility compared with states that do not. Finally, the paper analyses the eﬀect of state
enforcement eﬀorts on the safety and environmental performance of the natural gas pipeline industry. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section provides a
brief review of the relevant literature; Section 3 brieﬂy describes the natural gas pipeline
industry; Section 4 presents an analysis of state assumption of primacy for interstate natural
gas pipelines; Section 5 examines state enforcement eﬀorts and the performance of all
natural gas pipelines; and Section 6 discusses policy implications and concludes.

2.0 Related Literature
The most relevant literature for this paper is the literature on state regulation and enforcement of industry environmental and health and safety regulations. In this literature there
are several distinct strands that are related to this study: papers that examine state assumption of primacy for implementation of a federal regulatory programme; papers that
examine the eﬀect of primacy on the performance of regulated entities; and papers that
more generally examine the eﬀectiveness of state enforcement eﬀorts at increasing the
performance of regulated entities.
In addition to natural gas pipeline regulations, many of the other US environmental,
health, and safety regulations passed in the late 1960s and 1970s allow states to assume
primary authority for implementing and/or enforcing the federal regulations. Once the
federal government has created a detailed regulatory programme, states can apply for
primacy to implement parts or all of the regulations in their own state. One of the conditions for approval is that the state programme be at least as stringent as the federal
programme, thus preserving the standards set by the federal regulator. Assuming primacy
over federal regulation allows states to continue to play a signiﬁcant role in the design and
implementation of their own programmes as long as those programmes are consistent with
and at least as protective as the federal programme. In authorised states, the federal government provides partial funding through the use of state grants. The federal agency responsible for a particular programme implements and enforces the programme in states that do
not assume primacy. Additionally, in most cases the federal agency can revoke the state’s
authority to implement or enforce a particular regulation if the state’s programme is not
consistent with the federal standards.
Each state must make the decision of whether or not to adopt primacy. In a state where
citizens are strongly pro-environment and support stringent regulations, state leaders may
want to assume primacy in order to provide maximal protection for the environment.
Alternatively, states may want to assume primacy in areas where their citizens or business
interest favour a more relaxed regulatory stance as a way of protecting their constituents
from overzealous federal regulators. Chang et al. (2014) develop a model where the federal
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authority endogenously sets the federal policy and then allows states to adopt primacy.
Their model can generate both scenarios discussed above: cases where primacy is attractive
to states that prefer more stringent regulation and cases where states assume primacy in
order to weaken enforcement.
A handful of empirical analyses have examined the determinants of state assumption of
primacy for a range of US regulations.1 While the exact variables diﬀer across studies, most
include some measure of the severity of the problem the regulation is designed to ﬁx, the
role the regulated industry plays in the state economy, and political factors in the state.
One of the most consistent ﬁndings for environmental regulations is that states with
higher levels of industrialisation are more likely to have assumed primacy (Woods,
2005). The other ﬁndings tend to vary across studies. For example, even though the
assumption of primacy in environmental regulations has been used by many as a proxy
for pro-environment attitude on the part of a state, Woods (2005) ﬁnds that primacy in
US air and water regulations is unrelated to other measures of a state’s stance towards
environmental issues or policy. Moreover, he ﬁnds that states that have assumed primacy
in air and water regulations are less likely to have adopted policy innovations in those
areas. Conversely, Chang et al. (2014) ﬁnd that US states with stronger environmental
preferences assume primacy sooner than less green states for both water and hazardous
waste regulations.
Very little has been written on the direct eﬀect of primacy on states’ eﬀorts at implementing and enforcing regulatory programmes. One exception is Thompson and
Scicchitano (1985) who ﬁnd that states with primacy for US Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regulations have higher inspection and citation rates
than states where the federal government implements the regulations, although penalty
rates are lower.2 Instead, a number of papers focus on the eﬀect of primacy on regulatory
performance. Recall that in theory states may assume primacy either to increase or decrease
the level of regulation. Given the mixed results from studies that examine the factors that
drive states to assume primacy, this strand of the literature focuses on determining whether,
in practice, assuming primacy increases or decreases the performance or outcomes of
regulated ﬁrms.
Sigman (2005) analyses the water quality of rivers around the USA and examines
whether the primacy status of upstream states impacts the water quality of rivers. She
ﬁnds that water quality is signiﬁcantly lower when upstream states have assumed primacy
under the Clean Water Act which is consistent with states assuming primacy to weaken the
regulatory programme. On the other hand, Bradbury (2006) focuses on state primacy for
OSHA regulations and ﬁnds that primacy states have a lower rate of fatal injuries. In a
related study focusing on the construction industry, Morantz (2009) also ﬁnds that state
primacy for OSHA regulations signiﬁcantly decreases reported fatalities, but ﬁnds a
1

Cutter and DeShazo (2007) and Meyer and Konisky (2007) examine a related question — the delegation of regulatory authority from states to local governments.
2
A few papers have considered a separate but related question — the extent to which state characteristics that are
related to the assumption of primacy (political ideology, economic context, and so on) aﬀect a state’s implementation and enforcement eﬀorts. See, for example, Davis et al. (1989) which examines the characteristics that eﬀect
whether a state carries out the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 or Atlas
(2007) which examines the characteristics that aﬀect the size of penalties in the RCRA hazardous waste
programme.
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signiﬁcant increase of reported non-fatal injuries. One possible interpretation of these
results is that rather than absolutely strengthening or weakening a regulatory programme,
states with primacy may choose to focus on diﬀerent aspects of the regulatory programme
than the relevant federal agency.
A few studies more generally consider the eﬀectiveness of state enforcement eﬀorts at
increasing either compliance with regulations or ﬁrm performance. Staﬀord (2003)
considers a wide variety of state eﬀorts at increasing hazardous waste compliance at regulated facilities and ﬁnds that the number of state inspections (normalised by state gross
domestic product) does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on violations at regulated facilities.
In a paper that uses spatial econometric techniques, Gray and Shadbegian (2007) ﬁnd
that state air inspections do signiﬁcantly increase compliance with air pollution regulations,
although they do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on air emissions.
This paper will contribute to these various literatures or regulatory federalism by examining not only the assumption of primacy for natural gas pipeline regulations, but also the
eﬀect of primacy on the state enforcement eﬀorts. The paper will also provide insight into
the general eﬀectiveness of state regulatory enforcement eﬀorts in achieving the desired
outcome — fewer natural gas violations and accidents.

3.0 Overview of the US Natural Gas Pipeline Industry
Pipelines form the primary transportation system for natural gas in the USA. Once natural
gas is extracted from a well, it is typically transferred to a gas processing plant via gas gathering pipelines. After being processed, the natural gas is transported — often over long
distances — through high-pressure transmission pipelines that deliver the natural gas to
the various distribution systems. Lower pressure distribution pipelines then transport the
natural gas to various end users — industrial, commercial, and residential. According to
the PHMSA, the USA has around 16,500 miles of gas gathering pipelines, 320,000 miles
of transmission pipelines, and 2.1 million miles of distribution lines. There are approximately 2,500 natural gas pipeline operators — just over 100 of these operators own pipelines in multiple states while the remaining operators have pipelines in only one state.
Pipeline operators may focus on just one type of pipeline (for example, transmission or
distribution) or may manage multiple types of pipelines.
Natural gas distributors in the USA have long been subject to regulation by state and
local governments as utilities. In 1938 the passage of the Natural Gas Act allowed the
federal government to regulate natural gas pipelines for the ﬁrst time. The Act gave the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) jurisdiction over both the interstate transportation
and sale of natural gas as well as the ability to set standards for new interstate pipeline
construction. In 1977 the FPC’s regulatory power over pipelines was transferred to
FERC which continues to regulate the siting of and rates for pipelines today. The ﬁrst
statute to explicitly regulate pipeline safety was the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of
1968 which created the OPS within the DOT to oversee and implement pipeline safety regulations. Concern over pipeline safety and dissatisfaction with OPS’s performance has led
Congress periodically to try to improve the regulation of pipelines through additional legislation including the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, the 1992 Pipeline Safety
Act, the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, the 2002 Pipeline Safety
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Improvement Act, the 2006 Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act,
and the 2011 Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act. Together,
these legislative eﬀorts have enabled federal regulations covering a wide range of standards
and practices for pipeline materials, design, construction and operation including operator
training, emergency response, monitoring, and testing.
As discussed earlier, the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 gave states the right to
participate in regulating and enforcing pipeline safety and established requirements for
state participation. Currently states can participate in three diﬀerent types of programmes:
.

60150(a) Certiﬁcation — Gives states primacy in both inspection and enforcement of
intrastate pipelines;
60106 Agreement — Gives states primacy in inspection of intrastate pipelines, but
enforcement is conducted by federal authorities; and
Interstate Agent — Gives states primacy in inspection of interstate pipelines, but enforcement is conducted by federal authorities.

.
.

In states without an authorised natural gas pipeline programme, federal regulators are
responsible for both inter- and intra-state inspections and enforcement. In addition to
Table 1
State Natural Gas Pipeline Programmes in the USA
States with 60105(a) Certiﬁcation that also act as Interstate Agents
Arizona
Connecticut
Iowa

Michigan
Minnesota
New York

Ohio
Washington
West Virginia

States with 60105(a) Certiﬁcation that are not Interstate Agents
Alabama
Arkansas
California∗
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania∗∗
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia∗∗∗
Wisconsin
Wyoming

States with a Section 60106 Agreement
Pennsylvania (gas cooperatives)

Virginia (municipal systems)

States without a Natural Gas Pipeline Program
Alaska

Hawaii

Notes: ∗ Does not include municipal systems. ∗∗ Does not include gas cooperatives. ∗∗∗ Does not include municipal
systems.
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authorising the state programmes, PHMSA also provides grant funding to support state
programmes. Currently up to 80 per cent of state programme costs may be funded by
PHMSA.
Table 1 provides a list of the states by type of state programme. All of the 48 contiguous
states have primacy for intrastate natural gas pipelines. Additionally nine states have
primacy for inspection of interstate pipelines. Hawaii does not have any state pipeline
programme, which is perhaps unsurprising as it has the lowest number of pipeline miles
for all of the 50 states (723 miles) as well as the fewest miles per person ( just over half a
mile per person). Alaska does not have an independent state pipeline programme.
Instead, pipelines in Alaska are regulated by the Joint Pipeline Oﬃce (JPO), a unique authority established by Alaska and the federal government in 1990 to coordinate monitoring
and overseeing of the Tran-Alaska Pipeline System and a pipeline project to commercialise
North Slope gas. The JPO oversees both petroleum and natural gas pipelines within Alaska
and the adjoining Outer Continental Shelf.

4.0 State Primacy for Natural Gas Pipeline Regulations
Following the literature discussed in Section 2, the primacy analysis includes explanatory
variables that capture aspects of the main three competing explanations for the variance
in state environmental policies: the severity of the ‘problem’ in the state, state ideology
and politics, and the economic and institutional context. Unlike some of the primacy
papers discussed, this analysis does not try to examine the relationship between factors
‘internal’ to the states (such as those discussed above) and ‘external’ factors such as
policy diﬀusion and economic competition among states. The reason for the focus on
internal factors alone is based on the particular nature of the natural gas industry.
Unlike other sectors where states may compete among one another to try to attract ﬁrms
to locate in their state, the location of natural gas pipelines is primarily dictated by the
location of natural gas deposits, the location of natural gas customers, and geography.
Also, recall that all of the 48 contiguous states have primacy for intrastate natural gas pipelines, thus the focus of the primacy analysis is on the diﬀerences between states that have
primacy for interstate natural gas pipelines. As noted above, because Alaska and Hawaii
do not have independent state pipeline programmes, they are not included in the analysis.
Following Woods (2005), the binary dependent variable in the primacy analysis is equal
to one if the state has 60150(a) Certiﬁcation and zero otherwise. I use a probit model to
determine which of the explanatory variables have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
whether a state has primacy for natural gas pipelines. Table 2 presents the variables used
in the analysis and their means and standard deviations. The variables can be grouped
into three basic categories: variables designed to capture the extent of the potential natural
gas pipeline problem in the state; variables designed to capture ideology and politics in the
state; and variables designed to capture the economic and institutional context of the state.3
3

An alternative approach would be to model the decision to adopt primacy as a hazard model. However, due to
data limitations I was unable to conduct such an analysis. Given that the primacy decision can be revisited by
states, this approach focuses not on the timing of the adoption decision itself but rather on the factors that
determine whether a state currently has primacy for natural gas pipelines.
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Table 2
Variables Used in the Primacy Analysis
Variable

Description

Mean

Primacy

Natural gas production

Equal to one if the state has primacy for interstate natural
gas pipelines
Miles of natural gas transmission pipelines in the state in
thousands
Miles of natural gas gathering pipelines in the state in
thousands
Miles of natural gas distribution pipelines in the state in
thousands
Equal to one if state voted for Obama in the 2008
presidential election
Revenue received by environmental organisations in the state
in 2010 in millions
State government ideology in 2010
(100 = most liberal)
Natural gas production in billion cubic feet

Natural gas consumption

Natural gas consumption in billion cubic feet

Environmental expenditures
Income

Percentage of state expenditures directed toward
environment and natural resources in 2010
Per capita income in 2010 in thousands

RCRA authorisation

Percentage of RCRA regulations for which state has primacy

0.19
(0.39)
6.71
(9.80)
0.36
(1.01)
25.6
(22.1)
0.56
(0.50)
279
(376)
52.5
(25.2)
412
(1,096)
460
(580)
1.47
(1.21)
38.7
(5.7)
83.9
(20.0)

Transmission miles
Gathering miles
Distribution miles
Obama 2008
Environmental org. revenue
State government ideology

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

To measure the extent to which pipelines could endanger human health and the
environment, I include the total miles of natural gas pipeline in the state broken out by
type of pipeline, as the potential for damage could vary based on the type of pipeline.
To capture the politics and ideology of the citizens of a state, I include Obama 2008, a
binary variable equal to one if the state voted for Obama in the 2008 presidential election.
To capture the level of interest in the environment in the state, I include Environmental Org
Revenue which measures the total amount of contributions received from environmental
non-proﬁts in the state in 2010 according to the National Center for Charitable
Statistics’ Guidestar Database. State Government Ideology measures the ideological
position of the state government, including the governor and the major party delegations
of each house of the legislature, with a higher score indicating a more liberal position.4
To capture the economic importance of the natural gas industry to the state, I use two
measures from the US Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Production and
Natural Gas Consumption. To capture the overall importance of the environment to the
state, I include Environmental Expenditures which measures the percentage of total state
government expenditures that go to protecting the environment and natural resources in
4

I use the ADA/COPE measure of state government ideology constructed by Berry et al. (1998) and updated using
more recent data, available at http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/, last accessed 24 June 2016.
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Table 3
Results of the Interstate Primacy Probit Analysis
Explanatory variable

Coeﬃcient

Standard error

Transmission miles
Gathering miles
Distribution miles
Obama 2008
Environmental org. revenue
State government ideology
Natural gas production
Natural gas consumption
Environmental expenditures
Income
RCRA authorisation
Constant

1.38∗∗
5.93∗
−0.07
6.44∗∗
0.01∗∗
−0.05∗
−0.03∗
−0.01
−0.55
0.27
0.04
−17.85∗

0.70
3.01
0.08
2.99
0.003
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.91
0.18
0.03
10.64

Notes: ∗ Signiﬁcant at the 90 per cent level.

∗∗

Signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level.

the state using data from the US Census Bureau’s Annual Surveys of State & Local
Government Finance. I also include state per capita Income. Finally, to capture the institutional capacity of the state to assume primacy, I include the proxy RCRA Authorization
which measures the percentage of the RCRA hazardous waste programme for which the
state has assumed primacy using data from EPA’s State Authorization Tracking System.
Table 3 presents the result of the probit analysis of interstate gas pipeline primacy
adoption.5 Focusing ﬁrst on the measure of the potential size of the problem, note that
both Transmission Miles and Gathering Miles have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
while Distribution Miles has a negative and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. Given that distribution
pipelines are unlikely to cross state boundaries, the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on Distribution
Miles is not that surprising. Transmission pipelines are likely to cross state boundaries, so
the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on Transmission Miles is consistent with the idea that
states with more potential for damage from interstate pipelines are more likely to have
primacy for those pipelines. Gathering pipelines tend to be intra-state. However since gathering pipelines connect to transmission pipelines, gathering pipelines are highly correlated
with transmission lines (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.93) which may explain the positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on Gathering Miles.
Turning next to the political and ideological variables, note that all three have signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Both Obama 2008 and Environmental Org Revenue have positive coeﬃcients which is consistent with more liberal voters and citizens who value the environment
encouraging the state to assume primacy of the interstate pipeline in order to more carefully
regulate them. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on State Government Ideology is negative and
signiﬁcant, which is the opposite of what one would expect if liberal state governments
wanted to assume primacy to increase oversight of interstate pipelines. One possible explanation is that having controlled for the interests of voters, more liberal state governments
5

I also conducted similar analyses using per capita and per acre measures where applicable. The results were
generally consistent with those presented in Table 3, but the regression presented in Table 3 has the best ﬁt.
These additional results are available from the author upon request.
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are more willing to trust the federal government to appropriately regulate interstate
pipelines.
The negative coeﬃcients on Natural Gas Production and Natural Gas Consumption are
both consistent with the theory that states may want to have primacy to be more strict in
regulating interstate pipelines than the federal government and that states with more
economic interests are less likely to want to have strict regulations. Put more concisely,
states that are more dependent on the natural gas industry are less likely to want primacy
over interstate pipelines. Note that only the coeﬃcient on natural gas production is signiﬁcant at conventional levels, perhaps because the concentrated economic interests of natural
gas producers are more salient to states than the more diﬀuse interests of natural gas consumers. Also note that Environmental Expenditures do not have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient nor
does Income. Finally, the extent to which a state has assumed primacy for RCRA
(RCRA Authorization) also has no signiﬁcant eﬀect, which is consistent with the literature
on primacy which ﬁnds that the factors driving primacy tend to be very dependent on the
nature of the regulations.

5.0 State Enforcement Eﬀorts and Natural Gas Pipeline Performance
This part of the analysis focuses on state enforcement eﬀorts and their eﬀect on the
performance of natural gas pipelines. Initially, I focus on the role that primacy plays in
determining the level of a state’s enforcement eﬀorts and the performance of its pipelines.
I then consider more generally the relationship between state enforcement eﬀorts and
natural gas pipeline performance. I measure a state’s enforcement eﬀorts using four
variables: the number of inspection days at natural gas pipelines in the state, the number
of compliance actions conducted, the number of penalties assessed, and the dollar value
of penalties assessed. Data on the annual number of inspection days for each state was
collected through a Freedom of Information Act request to PHMSA. The data for the
other three variables are available from the PHMSA website. Because states vary signiﬁcantly in the total miles of pipeline in the state from a low of 760 miles in Vermont to
over 16,000 miles in Texas, each of the four eﬀort variables is normalised by the miles of
gas pipeline in a state. While inspection days and penalty number and dollar value are
self-explanatory, the deﬁnition of a compliance action is less obvious. According to
PHMSA, a compliance action is ‘an action or series of sequential actions taken to enforce
pipeline regulations’. A compliance action can cover multiple violations and can range from
as little as a letter warning future penalties for continued violations to an administratively
imposed penalty to a criminal sanction.
Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation for each of the eﬀort variables for
2009–11 for all 48 contiguous states as well as for primacy states and non-primacy states.
I use three years of data to get an overall representation of states’ eﬀort levels and conclude
the analysis in 2011 to exclude any potential for changes in federal enforcement stemming
from the passage of the 2011 Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act.
On average states spend just under 30 days a year (88 in three years) inspecting 1,000 miles
of pipeline. Over three years, for each 1,000 miles of pipelines states conduct an average of
10 compliance actions and assess four penalties with a total dollar value of just over
$23,000. Not surprisingly, as demonstrated by the standard deviations for these eﬀort
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Table 4
Mean State Enforcement Eﬀorts per Thousand Miles of Natural Gas Pipelines, 2009–11

Inspection days

Compliance
actions

Number of
penalties assessed

Value of
penalties assessed

Overall
(N = 48)

88
(73)

10
(32)

4
(21)

$23,053
($68,687)

Primacy states
(N = 9)

112
(72)

3
(3)

1
(1)

$23,190
($37,110)

Non-primacy states
(N = 39)

82
(73)

12
(35)

5
(22)

$23,020
($74,470)

Group

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

measures, there is a wide range of eﬀorts across states. What is perhaps more surprising is
the fact that the correlation between these diﬀerent eﬀort measures is not particularly high:
the correlation between inspection days and compliance actions is 0.41 and the correlation
between inspections and number of penalties is only 0.13. Compliance actions are more
highly correlated with number of penalties (0.67) although the correlation between compliance actions and the value of penalties is only 0.42. As one might expect, the highest correlation is between number of penalties and penalty dollars, with a correlation coeﬃcient of
0.68. Primacy states have more inspection days and a higher dollar value of penalties
assessed, but neither diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. Primacy states have fewer compliance actions and penalties assessed per mile, but once again neither diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant. Recall that in theory states may adopt primacy both to strengthen or weaken a
regulatory programme — these results do not provide compelling evidence that either is
occurring across the board with respect to natural gas pipelines.
Even though none of the eﬀort variables are statistically diﬀerent for primacy/nonprimacy states, the real test is not whether the inputs into enforcement are diﬀerent, but
whether the outcomes — that is, the performance of the regulated entities — are diﬀerent.
PHMSA tracks four performance measures that are meaningful for natural gas pipelines:
the number of incidents, injuries, and fatalities, and the total value of property damage.
PHMSA deﬁnes an incident as any event that results in a death or personal injury necessitating in-patient hospitalisation; an explosion or unintentional ﬁre; any event that results in
property damage of $50,000 or more (excluding cost of material lost); any event that results
in unintentional loss of three million cubic feet of gas; any emergency that results in an
emergency shutdown of a facility; or any other event that is signiﬁcant in the judgement
of the operator. Injuries include any injury that requires medical attention. Fatalities and
property damage are self-explanatory. As was the case for the eﬀort measures, I use
three years of data and normalise the performance measures by the miles of gas pipeline
in a state.
Over three years, states experience on average under one incident per 1,000 miles.
Injuries are more rare than incidents, with only one injury per 10,000 miles every three
years. Thankfully, fatalities are even more rare with only one fatality per 50,000 miles
every three years. Property damage is much more common with an average of over
$90,000 a year in property damage for every 1,000 miles of pipeline. There is also a lot
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Table 5
Mean Performance per Thousand Miles of Natural Gas Pipelines, 2009–11
Group

Incidents

Injuries

Fatalities

Property Damage

Overall
(N = 48)

0.77
(2.42)

0.10
(0.13)

0.02
(0.05)

$279,447
($707,068)

Primacy states
(N = 9)

0.39
(0.20)

0.11
(0.08)

0.02
(0.02)

$90,459
($48,987)

Non-primacy states
(N = 39)

0.85
(2.68)

0.10
(0.14)

0.03
(0.05)

$323,059
($779,403)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

of variation in both incidents and property damage, with less variation in injuries and fatalities. Only incidents and property damage are highly correlated, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.71. The remaining correlation coeﬃcients are all less than 0.25. Table 5
presents the mean and standard deviation for each of the performance variables for
2009–11.6 Given that each of the variables measures an undesirable outcome, lower
values indicate better performance. Comparing the primacy and non-primacy states, note
that in terms of incidents, fatalities, and property damage, primacy states have a better
mean level of performance, although the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Since there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in either enforcement inputs or
outcomes per pipeline mile across the board for primacy and non-primacy states, the
ﬁnal part of the analysis focuses on the relationship between enforcement inputs and
outcomes regardless of primacy. To conduct this analysis, I construct a panel data set of
natural gas pipeline performance and enforcement eﬀorts for the 48 contiguous states.
The data set consists of annual state enforcement data from 2006 to 2011 and annual
state pipeline performance data from 2007 to 2012. I use a ﬁxed-eﬀects time series analysis,
lagging the enforcement eﬀorts by one year to mitigate concerns about the potential endogeneity of the enforcement eﬀorts.7 There is no missing data on either state eﬀorts or performance, thus the panel is both ﬁxed and balanced. Using a ﬁxed-eﬀects model allows one
to control for ﬁxed factors that do not change over time including factors that cannot be
observed such as the underlying diﬀerences that drive some states to adopt primacy and/
or additional natural gas pipeline requirements. Thus it focuses on the relationship between
the inputs into the enforcement process and the outcomes. In addition to the eﬀort
variables, I include three time-varying explanatory variables: State GDP to control for
diﬀerences in the economic conditions in each state and Natural Gas Production and
Natural Gas Consumption to control for diﬀerences in the utilisation of pipelines across
the states. As was the case for earlier analysis, all variables are normalised by the
number of natural gas pipeline miles.
6

I also considered a 10-year period of performance, 2004–13. The results for those 10 years are qualitatively the
same as those for the three-year period reported in Table 7.
7
An F-test indicated that time ﬁxed-eﬀects did not improve the model.
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Table 6
Results of the Fixed-Eﬀects Regression for Pipeline Performance, 2007–12
Explanatory variable
(per mile of NG pipeline)
Inspection dayst − 1
Compliance actionst − 1
Number of penalties assessedt − 1

Incidents
per mile

Injuries
per mile

Fatalities
per mile

Property Damage
per mile

7.28

−0.41

0.65

7.91

(9.77)

(0.31)

(0.69)

(7.38)

1.21

−0.02

0.24

2.35

(2.62)

(0.11)

(0.24)

(2.32)

−9.14

0.35

−1.81

−9.68

(13.11)

(0.26)

(2.65)

(14.05)

−0.02

−0.01

−0.22∗

Value of penalties assessedt − 1

−0.39∗∗
(0.14)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.12)

State GDPt

−0.51

0.01

−0.03

−0.40

(0.41)

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.31)

0.06

−0.02

0.01

0.06

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.05)

0.01

−0.01

0.001

0.02

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.001)

(0.06)

Natural gas productiont
Natural gas consumptiont
Constant

4.69

0.01

0.26

3.31

(3.14)

(0.11)

(0.21)

(2.40)

Notes: All variables normalised by state natural gas pipeline miles. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗
Signiﬁcant at the 90 per cent level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level.

Table 6 presents the results of the ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions. For the four lagged eﬀort
variables, only Value of Penalties Assessedt − 1 has a consistently negative sign and is signiﬁcant in two of the four regressions — the regressions for Incidents and Property Damage.
These results provide evidence that penalties for pipeline violations can act as an eﬀective
deterrent and improve overall performance and safety, since increasing the dollar value of
penalties assessed by a state does have the desired eﬀect of decreasing the number of incidents
and the level of property damage caused by natural gas pipelines. The fact that there is no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on injuries and fatalities may be due to the fact that injuries and fatalities
are less likely to occur in the ﬁrst place. Additionally, injuries and fatalities may be due to
factors that are not easily addressed by enforcement eﬀorts. For example, the fatal
New York gas pipeline explosion in 2014 has been blamed on the aging pipeline infrastructure, something that is not directly addressed by pipeline regulations. Thus penalties for
pipeline violations may not address many of the root causes of pipeline injuries and fatalities.
Note that although Number of Penalties Assessedt − 1 does not have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
any of the regressions, the coeﬃcient is negative in three of the four regressions which also is
consistent with penalties having a deterrent eﬀect on poor pipeline performance.
Interestingly, although Staﬀord (2014) found evidence suggesting that states with
greater enforcement eﬀorts encouraged individual pipelines to perform better, this analysis
does not ﬁnd that state inspections have any signiﬁcant eﬀect. Not only is the coeﬃcient on
Inspection Dayst − 1 not signiﬁcant, in three of the regressions the coeﬃcient is positive. This
ﬁnding is analogous to Staﬀord’s ﬁnding that federal inspections do not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on individual pipeline performance. The coeﬃcient on Compliance Actionst − 1 is also
not signiﬁcant in any of the regressions and is positive in three of the regressions providing
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no evidence that compliance actions in and of themselves without any penalties attached
have any eﬀect on performance. One possible explanation for this result could be that
compliance actions include a number of diﬀerent actions that vary signiﬁcantly in severity
and consequences. Thus a letter of warning which may have no consequences is counted the
same as the imposition of criminal sanctions. Unfortunately, the data available from
PHMSA do not allow one to separate minor actions from more severe ones.
Taken together, these ﬁndings are perhaps not that surprising to someone who believes
in an economic model of regulatory violations. Such models, based on Becker’s (1968)
model of crime, assume that a regulated entity’s decision to comply with regulations is a
rational one based on the objective of proﬁt maximisation. Thus regulated entities only
comply with regulations when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance.
In such a situation, monetary penalties would be the primary mechanism for states to
inﬂuence pipeline compliance and in turn those aspects of performance that are most
directly tied to compliance. One could argue that overall incidents and property damage
are more likely tied to regulatory compliance than injuries and fatalities due to the
nature of events (such as explosions) that are most likely to lead to injuries and fatalities.
Under the economic model of compliance, other eﬀorts such as inspections and compliance
actions would not change behaviour themselves, although inspections and compliance
actions may be important intermediate inputs in assessing penalties.

6.0 Policy Implications and Conclusions
The safety and performance of natural gas pipelines is an issue that reappears in the media
every time there is a fatal pipeline explosion. Given recent history and an expanding
network of gas pipelines, such events are likely to happen again in the not so distant
future. In the USA, attention to the issue after a particularly disastrous event has in the
past legislative responses to strengthen gas pipeline regulations or increase regulatory enforcement. However, it is not clear that such responses will actually serve to signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the number of injuries and fatalities associated with natural gas pipelines.
Given that enforcement of pipeline safety regulations in the USA takes place at both the
federal and state level, this paper examines the role that states play in overseeing natural gas
pipelines to better understand what can be done at the state level to improve natural gas
performance. Looking ﬁrst at the drivers behind state assumption of primacy with respect
to interstate natural gas pipelines, I ﬁnd that states with larger networks of gas gathering
and transmission lines are more likely to have primacy, perhaps because they are faced
with a larger potential problem from gas pipelines and prefer to have the power to enforce
regulations for all pipelines, both intra- and inter-state, that pass through their borders.
Political factors also play a role, with states with more liberal voters and more proenvironment groups being more likely to have primacy. However states for whom the natural
gas production industry is an important contributor to the economy are less likely to have
primacy.
Focusing on state enforcement eﬀorts and pipeline performance, I ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across the board either in enforcement eﬀorts or pipeline performance
for primacy and non-primacy states — perhaps because states may not all assume primacy
for the same reasons. Thus if states want to increase pipeline performance, assuming primacy
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without making other changes is unlikely to increase pipeline performance. When I examine
the relationship between state enforcement eﬀorts and performance directly, I ﬁnd that the
one factor that does have an eﬀect on performance is the amount of penalty dollars assessed
on natural gas pipelines. However, penalties only have a signiﬁcant eﬀect for incidents and
property damage. These results are consistent with an economic model of regulatory compliance where pipeline operators comply with regulations only when it is cheaper to comply
than to not. Increasing penalties is a key factor in making non-compliance more expensive
than compliance. If compliance is directly tied to incidents and property damage, then
increasing penalties will result in lower levels of incidents and property damage, as we
observe. The lack of a signiﬁcant relationship between penalties and injuries and fatalities
could be due to the fact that compliance is not as tightly correlated with injuries and fatalities
as it is with incidents and property damage.
If the real concern is decreasing injuries and fatalities associated with natural gas pipelines, then increasing inspections — as is often called for in response to pipeline disasters —
does not appear to be the optimal solution. While raising penalties may improve overall
compliance and general performance, it is less clear that higher penalties will have the
desired eﬀect of preventing additional devastating explosions. To reduce the likelihood
of such events and the resulting injuries and fatalities, we need to look for other policy
solutions that directly address the root causes of those events.
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